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Abstract 
Relying on a rich frm-level dataset for one of the top product market reformers among OECD coun-
tries over the last decade, we fnd a positive association, already in the short-run, between frm-level 
productivity and deregulation of intermediate goods sectors. The long-run effects are mediated by 
frm-level productivity, with gains increasing with the distance to the (national) sectorial technological 
frontier. As laggard frms are more likely to be held-up by upstream producers with large market power, 
they have more to gain vis-à-vis more productive frms that are better equipped to deal with the inef-
fciencies of upstream markets. For the highly productive, the reduction of their competitive edge vis-
à-vis low performers, coupled with decreased mark-ups and increased uncertainty, reduce their incen-
tives to innovate. Importantly, we fnd evidence of positive selection among laggard companies: for 
viable frms, the reforms unlock their growth potential and allow them to catch-up; for non-viable 
laggards, the likelihood of exit increases as they are not able to compete in the more demanding envi-
ronment. In fact, while the increased competition downstream (resulting from increased competition 
upstream) is associated with higher exit probabilities for all frms, we fnd a stronger association for 
low productivity frms. Finally, by comparing the performance of frms more and less exposed to pre-
crisis reforms, we show that the survival of the fttest and the unlocking of viable laggards growth 
boosts the resilience of the frms operating in the market. 
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1. Introduction 
While in most developed countries competition is already high in the fnal goods sectors, 
given the integration into world trade, there are still important regulatory barriers sheltering 
intermediate goods producers, such as telecommunications services or energy providers. 
Increased competition in these upstream markets is expected to foster frm entry, allow the 
best performing frms to grow and potentiate the exit of the least productive, not only in the 
deregulated sectors but also more broadly, given the vertical linkages with other sectors in 
the economy. 
There are multiple channels for these indirect effects of upstream deregulation on down-
stream frms to materialize, operating both via the intensive and extensive margins (see, for 
instance, Bourlés et al., 2013)1. The lack of competition in the intermediate goods market 
translates into higher market-power of frms in those sectors vis-à-vis fnal goods producers. 
Upstream frms are thus able to extract a rent from downstream producers, reducing the in-
centive to invest and innovate downstream (as a smaller fraction of the gain will be appropri-
ated by the frm incurring the cost of the investment). Moreover, a more stringent regulatory 
environment reduces entry upstream and therefore makes it more diffcult for new fnal good 
producers to access intermediate goods suppliers, reducing competition also downstream. 
The reduced competition allows non-viable frms –that would otherwise be forced to exit– to 
remain in the market and thus leads to an ineffcient allocation of resources. But increased 
upstream competition may also have detrimental effects on upstream innovation, impacting 
the quality of the inputs used downstream. Several studies focused on the liberalization of 
the electricity sector in different countries fnd that increased competition and uncertainty 
reduce spending on R&D, at least in the short-run, which in turn may have long-lasting 
consequences (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011 and 2008; and Sanyal and Cohen, 2009). 
Overall, the indirect effects are likely to be heterogeneous across frms, in particular in 
relation to frms’ ex-ante productivity levels. Laggard frms are more prone to being held-up 
by upstream frms, have less ability to cope with upstream market power and are more de-
pendent on the prevailing intermediate goods market conditions. Therefore, they may have 
more to gain with increased competition upstream. 
At the same time, increased competition in intermediate markets is likely to trickle-down 
and boost competition downstream (e.g. as entry becomes more appealing with improved 
access to upstream suppliers). As modelled by Aghion et al. (2005), the impact of competi-
tion on productivity depends on the balance between changes in pre and post innovation 
rents. If the reduction in post-innovation rents is suffciently large, then competition has a 
discouraging (or Schumpeterian) effect, curbing innovation. Conversely, if competition re-
duces pre-innovation rents by more than it reduces post-innovation rents, it increases the 
incremental returns from innovation and thus fosters investments that allow frms to escape 
competition. One could therefore argue that escape competition is more likely to occur for 
frms closer to the technological frontier, as they have more to gain ex-post by becoming 
leaders. 
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However, too much competition erodes the escape competition incentives, making it 
more likely for the discouraging effect to dominate. For instance, market uncertainty may 
induce leaders to engage in safer competitiveness boosting alternatives, in detriment of more 
disruptive, but also riskier, innovation strategies (e.g. incremental innovations with lower 
impact on productivity or cost reducing measures such as reducing wage costs, e.g. via relo-
cation; Amable et al., 2016). Also, it may reduce available funding, given the negative impact 
of competition on the value of frms’ pledgeable assets, thereby acting as a drag on innova-
tion (Petropoulos, 2017). 
Therefore, the role of productivity in mediating the indirect impact of deregulation up-
stream on downstream frms is an open empirical question. Some authors fnd evidence that 
the impact increases with productivity, therefore being more benefcial for the best perform-
ing frms (e.g. Bourlés et al., 2013; Arnold et al., 2008). Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017) 
show that competition indeed fosters investment by the leaders, discouraging laggards that 
are unable to compete with new entrants. But if the process leads to increased concentration 
ex-post, the relative investment by frontier frms is adversely impacted (Gutiérrez and Philip-
pon, 2017). Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and Conway et al. (2006) argue that deregulation 
is actually increasing with the distance to the frontier, as enhanced competition creates the 
incentives for laggards to catch-up. Amable et al. (2016) argues that the impact is negative 
for the highly productive, given the reduction in mark-ups. In the same vein, Autor et al. 
(2016) fnd a negative relation between competition and patent production. 
Another open empirical question relates to the timing of the effects. While the long-term 
impact is crucial to ascertain the possible benefts of increased competition in intermediate 
goods markets, the short-run effects are essential for the political economy of the reform 
process and for the design of the reform packages (e.g. bundling, sequencing, the use of 
grandfathering rules or compensation mechanisms). For instance, if increased competition 
fosters the exit of a telecommunications incumbent, it may take time for the client frms to 
fnd a new supplier, with switching costs during the process. Moreover, the exit of the least 
productive frms may temporarily increase unemployment, reducing short-term aggregate 
demand. And agents’ possible perception of increased income insecurity may increase pre-
cautionary savings, further reducing aggregate demand. 
Existing empirical applications are not conclusive on the prevalence and relevance of 
these short-run costs, which are likely to depend on the structure and cyclical position of the 
different economies (e.g. Égert and Gal, 2016b; Bouis et al., 2012; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015 
and Gal and Hijzen, 2016). Model based-simulations fnd that short-term costs are more 
likely for small open economies (Cacciatore et al., 2015), for economies at the zero lower 
bound (Eggertsson et al., 2013) and during downturns (IMF, 2016). 
Overall, if one fnds evidence that increased competition succeeds in promoting frm 
growth (intensive channel) and in fostering the survival of the fttest (extensive channel), it 
is also likely that it boost frms’ ability to weather shocks. Existing literature supports this 
conjecture, providing evidence of increased resilience and reduced volatility (Cacciatori and 
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Fiori, 2016; Duval et al., 2007; Ernst et al., 2007; Pelkmans et al., 2008). Portugal provides 
an interesting application to study those mechanisms, given the severity of the crisis that 
affected the country. 
In this paper, we focus on the link between competition upstream and frm-level produc-
tivity downstream, building on the empirical models of Arnold et al. (2008) and Bourlés et 
al. (2010), which in turn are based on the theoretical contributions of Acemoglu et al. (2006) 
and Aghion and Howitt (2006). Making use of a novel indicator of regulatory impact devel-
oped by the OECD, our identifying assumption is that frms operating in sectors which use 
more intensively intermediate goods inputs are more affected by restrictions to competition 
is those sectors. 
This contribution aims at providing empirical insights into two open questions in the 
literature. First, we assess whether the short-run costs of reforms were present for the Portu-
guese economy. Portugal is a rich case study given that it was a top product market reformer 
among OECD countries, particularly in a period where all the three factors described in the 
model-based literature as likely to induce short-term costs – economic crisis and zero lower 
bound, in the context of a small open economy - were at play. Second, we shed light on the 
role of frm-level productivity in mediating the impact of product market reforms, both at the 
intensive and extensive margins. Again, Portugal is particularly suited for the study of frm-
level heterogeneous effects, given the availability of high-quality, yearly census data on all 
Portuguese frms, covering balance sheet and proft and loss data. Finally, by making use of 
a large crisis episode, we test whether the intensive and extensive margin results contribute 
to enhance frms’ ability to weather adverse shocks. 
We do fnd evidence of a positive association between upstream deregulation and pro-
ductivity already in the short-run, even though most reforms were implemented during crisis 
years, where short-run costs are more likely. The long-term gains are increasing with the 
frms’ distance to the sectorial technological frontier. This result may indicate that ineffcient 
intermediate goods markets are particularly damaging for laggard frms or that the trickle-
down effects on downstream competition provided the needed incentives for laggards to 
catch-up in order to remain in the market. For the highly productive (the 2% most productive 
within each sector) deregulation upstream is actually detrimental, which may be linked with 
the negative impact of reduced mark-ups and increased market uncertainty on the willing-
ness to engage in riskier, disruptive innovation, in particular during periods of great eco-
nomic uncertainty. Moreover, while we fnd that the trickle down effects of higher competi-
tion upstream on downstream competition are associated, as expected, with a higher exit 
probability for individual frms, we also show that the effect is stronger for the least produc-
tive, reducing market congestion. 
The two results combined – the intensive and extensive margin channels - highlight the
relevance of product market reforms in promoting a more effcient resource allocation, by a
process of frm selection: the least productive frms that have scope to improve and catch-up
with the frontier are able to remain in the market and grow closer to the frontier; but those that
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do not have conditions to enhance their productivity and become more competitive are forced
to leave. This virtuous process is likely to promote higher resilience, as larger and more pro-
ductive companies are better prepared to deal with adverse shocks. Also, the reduced market
power upstream makes it more diffcult for upstream producers to pass-on the crisis induced
costs to downstream producers. By comparing frms operating in sectors more and less ex-
posed to pre-crisis reforms to other frms operating in less exposed sectors, we indeed provide
evidence of a positive impact of more effcient intermediate goods markets on downstream
frms’ resilience, with a more limited damaging impact of the crisis on productivity. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant literature; 
Section 3 presents the regulatory variables and the main reforms introduced in recent years; 
Section 4 described the frm-level data; Section 5 presents the analytical framework and the 
results; Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
There is an extensive literature on the long-run aggregate benefts of promoting a healthy 
level of competition in product markets2. Both model based simulations (e.g. IMF, 2016; 
Andrés et al., 2014; Everaert and Schule, 2008; and Arpaia et al., 2007) and applied econo-
metric research (e.g. Arnold and Barbosa, 2015; Barnes et al., 2013; Bouis and Duval, 2011; 
Bouis et al., 2012; IMF, 2015; OECD, 2015) confrm the existence of aggregate productiv-
ity gains that result from the growth of viable incumbents and increased churn-rates (Euro-
pean Commission, 2005; Schiantarelli, 2005; Lanau and Topalova, 2016, Gal and Hijzen, 
2016). 
These effects are mediated by a number of country and sectorial specifcities, such as the 
initial regulatory stance, reform complementarities or the degree of competitiveness in the 
downstream market (e.g. Égert and Gal, 2016b; Bouis et al., 2012; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015 
and Gal and Hijzen, 2016)3. Firm-level specifcities also play a determinant role. The dif-
ferential impact across the frm-level productivity distribution is particularly relevant to shed 
light on the transmission mechanisms and on the aggregate impact of the reforms and it is 
an open empirical question. 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) show that, in manufacturing, the gains are greater the 
further a given country is from the technology leader, via improved incentives and opportuni-
ties to catch-up with the frontier. Amable et al. (2016) argue that the effects may even turn 
negative for the highly productive, which face higher uncertainty and lower incentives to 
engage in disruptive innovation. Autor et al. (2016) also fnd a negative relation between 
competition and patent production. 
On the contrary, Arnold et al. (2008) and Bourlés et al. (2013) show that regulation is 
particularly detrimental for frms closer to international best practices. Gutiérrez and Philip-
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pon (2017) corroborate the positive impact of competition for leading frms, discouraging 
investment for the laggards. However, if, over time, this leads to increased market concentra-
tion via the growth of frontier frms, the relative investment of the best performing may be 
adversely impacted (Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2017). 
On top of heterogeneity across frms, reforms may also have heterogeneous effects 
across time. Model based contributions show that long-term benefts may nevertheless entail 
short-term costs, particularly likely during downturns (IMF, 2016), for small open econo-
mies (Cacciatore et al., 2015) and for economies at the zero lower bound (Eggertsson et al., 
2013). 
The evidence on applied econometric literature corroborates that short-term gains are 
not granted. For instance, while Cacciatore and Fiore (2016) and Bouis et al. (2012) fnd 
evidence of short-term costs, Gal and Hijzen (2016) and Barone and Cingano (2011) show 
that product market reforms bring gains already in the short-run. Firm-level national studies, 
such as Forlani (2012) for France and Lanau and Topalova (2016) for Italy, also provide 
evidence of short-term gains. A number of authors (e.g. IMF, 2016; Adhikari et al., 2016; 
and Dabla-Norris et al., 2015) highlight the role of macroeconomic conditions, notably in 
the short-run, with downturns reducing the expected gains. 
The studies discussed above evaluate the impact of product market reforms from two 
angles: their direct effect on the intermediate goods markets and their effects on the economy 
at large, via vertical integration. For instance, while Gal and Hijzen (2016) and Lanau and 
Topalova (2016) focus mainly on upstream effects, Barone and Cingano (2011), Forlani 
(2012) and Bourlés et al. (2013) study the impact of reforms on downstream industries. Our 
contribution fts into the second work-stream. 
Overall, if reforms give rise to a more effcient “creative destruction” process, they are 
also expected to improve the economy’s shock resilience, a result corroborated by Duval et 
al. (2007). In the same vein, Ernst et al. (2007) conclude that product market reforms reduce 
consumption volatility in the economy and Pelkmans et al. (2008) stress their role in lubri-
cating shock adjustments, price stickiness and infation persistence. Finally, Cacciatori and 
Fiori (2016) show that business cycle fuctuations and economic volatility decrease with the 
implementation of product market reforms. 
3. Product market regulation 
In recent years, Portugal implemented a large number of structural policies aimed at 
increasing productivity, fostering a more effcient allocation of resources and improving re-
silience to shocks. Product market reforms were a key area, given the dimension of the pre-
existing challenges and the expected payoffs4. Data from the OECD capturing the stringency 
of product market regulation shows that while in 2003 Portugal was among the least compe-
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tition-friendly economies, it was also one of the top reformers in the decade that followed 
(Figure 1). In 2013 the country is, for the frst time, below the OECD average. 
Figure 1: Product Market Regulation indicator 
Source: OECD and authors own computations. Notes: The indicator increases with the stringency of regulation. 
Values below the trend line can be read as above average reform efforts, given the initial regulatory stance. 
The product market reform agenda covered a large number of measures, aimed at
fostering competition and reducing the excessive rents of sheltered sectors. The main
measures implemented included the liberalization of gas and electricity markets, with the
phasing out of regulated tariffs; negotiations with energy producers to reduce rents and
eliminate the tariff debt; the creation of a transports regulator; the reduction of ports op-
erating costs; new telecommunications regulatory framework, including the reduction of
termination rates and lower restrictions on customers’ mobility; a competition enhancing
framework in the postal sector; several steps in the direction of the liberalisation of 19
regulated professions; the revision of the competition law and an improved enforcement
(e.g. with the creation of specialized courts); and the elimination of State special rights
in private companies.
Given that the reforms were broad-based, we rely on three OECD sub-indicators of 
sectorial product market regulation that allow us for a good depiction of the different re-
formed areas5. The frst covers the regulatory environment on seven network sectors, name-
ly telecoms, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger transport, and road freight. For each of 
them, the indicator takes into account, where applicable, entry regulations, public ownership, 
vertical integration, market structure and price controls. 
The second focuses on regulated professions, namely accounting, legal, engineering and 
architectural services. For each, the indicator captures not only entry barriers (i.e. exclusive 
rights, education requirement, compulsory chamber membership and quotas) but also con-
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duct regulations (i.e. quotas, prices and fees, marketing and advertising, form of business and 
inter-professional cooperation). 
The third sub-indicator is a measure of regulation in retail distribution and covers regis-
tration and licensing, special regulation of large outlets, protection of existing frms, regula-
tion of shop opening hours, price controls and, fnally, promotions and discounts. 
The focus of our analysis is the downstream impact of the described regulatory changes 
and therefore we need a measure of the exposure of the different downstream sectors to those 
upstream regulations. The resulting indicator of regulatory impact aims at measuring the 
potential costs of the anti-competitive regulation in network sectors, retail distribution and 
professional services on the different sectors of the economy that use the output of those 
regulated sectors as intermediate inputs: 
The indicator is computed by the OECD for each of the 37 sectors of the economy (k). 
It weighs the degree of regulation in the different non-manufacturing sectors j in year t 
(Regulation) by the exposure (w) of sector k to the non-manufacturing sector j. Exposure is 
measured as the share of inputs from sector j on total inputs used in the production process 
of sector k, sourced from the OECD input-output matrices6. The intuition is that an electric-
ity intensive sector is likely to be more affected by a liberalization of the electricity market 
than a sector less reliant on electricity as an input. 
The fnal indicator (RegImpact) is normalized to [0,1], increasing in the regulatory im-
pact, and it is available in two versions. We rely on the wide version, which includes network 
sectors, retail distribution and professional services as upstream sectors. It has decreased 
substantially in the past decade: for instance, the maximum regulatory exposure was 0.55 in 
2004, 0.43 in 2008 and 0.36 in 2013 (Table A1 in the Appendix provides detailed data on the 
time evolution of the indicator for the different sectors). The narrow version, which only 
considers regulation in network sectors, is also tested for robustness purposes7. 
4. Firm level data 
Firm level data are sourced from the IES database - Informação Empresarial Simplif-
cada (Simplifed Corporate Information) provided by INE - Instituto Nacional de Estatística 
(Statistics Portugal). The IES was formally created by Decree-Law No 8/2007 of 17 January 
and the reporting within that framework is mandatory since 2007. Before IES, INE relied on 
survey data from Inquérito Anual às Empresas8. Broadly, IES is an electronically way to 
provide accounting, fscal and statistical data in a single step, promoting transparency and 
effciency in data transmission. It includes detailed information on income statements and 
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balance sheet data for all Portuguese frms, as reported simultaneously to the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Justice, Bank of Portugal and INE. 
The initial dataset covers 3,916,315 frm-year observations for the period 2004-2014. To 
ensure consistency and robustness, we focus on frms with positive values of assets, turnover, 
external supplies and services and with non-negative personnel expenses and number of 
employees. In addition, using the 3-digit level NACE Rev. 3, we exclude specifc sectors, 
namely fnancial activities and insurance services, health care, entertainment, domestic staff 
and international organizations, given the specifcities of their business models. With these 
exclusions, we reach a dataset of 3,199,118 observations. Moreover, due to lack of underly-
ing data, we are not able to compute total factor productivity (TFP) for around 300,000 ob-
servations, leaving us with a total of 2,892,449 observations. 
The main performance variable is TFP, although we also compute Labour Productivity 
(LP) (output per worker), for robustness checks. TFP is computed using the Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) semi-parametric estimation method, which addresses the endogeneity prob-
lems arising from methods such as OLS or fxed-effects estimators that do not account for 
the correlation between input levels and productivity9. 
Olley and Pakes (1996) proposed a consistent two-step estimator, with investment as a 
proxy the unobservable productivity term. Building on this method, Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) suggest the use of intermediate inputs as an alternative to investment, given that the 
former is likely to adjust more smoothly to productivity shocks (and investments are more 
often zeros in frms reported balance sheets, preventing the TFP computation). 
The estimation departs from a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
Where y is the logarithm of the firm’s output; l and mt are variable inputs, namely the t t 
logarithm of labor and intermediate inputs, respectively; and k  is the logarithm of the state t 
variable capital. h is the error term that has two components: one correlated with the input t
(w , the productivity component) and another uncorrelated with the input choices. t 
Demand for the intermediate input mt depends on the firm’s state variables k  and w :t t 
Under a mild assumptions, the demand function is monotonically increasing in w  andt 
can thus be inverted, allowing for productivity to be written as a function of two observed 
variables. 
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Finally, assuming that productivity is ruled by a first-order Markov process w = t 
E[w ⎟w ] + x , where x  is an innovation to productivity, uncorrelated with kt but not neces-t t-1 t t 
sarily with l , the production function can be re-written as:t 
Estimation proceeds in two stages: the frst allows for the estimation of bl, using a third-
order polynomial approximation in k and m , whereas in the second stage one recovers thet t 
state variable coeffcients10. 
Instead of a two-step estimation, Woolridge (2009) proposes a more effcient GMM 
framework, taking into account the potential contemporaneous error correlation of the two 
stages of the original Levinsohn and Petrin approach (and, also, heteroskedasticity and se-
rial correlation). Different applications (e.g Gal, 2013; Fontagné and Santoni, 2015; Mollisi 
and Rovigatti, 2017) show that coeffcient estimates derived from the two methods are simi-
lar, with no signifcant impact in the results. 
In our estimation, we defned inputs as follows: capital refers to fxed assets, labor to 
number of employees and intermediate inputs is proxied by external supplies and services. 
These entails a number of important limitations, as discussed for instance in Gal (2013). In 
particular, TFP differentials may capture differences in markups, labor quality, intangibles 
and capacity utilisation. 
The technological frontier is defned as the frms in the 90th percentile for the estimated 
TFP, by year and sector, as in OECD (2016). The distance to the frontier (DTF) is computed 
for each frm as the difference between its TFP level and the TFP at the frontier, for each year 
and sector. 
Sectorial fxed effects are constructed using the 3-digit level NACE Rev 311. Region 
fxed effects are obtained with the NUT 2 Portuguese regional division12. Additionally, fol-
lowing the literature (e.g. OECD, 2014), frm size controls are included. In line with the 
Statistics Portugal methodology, each frm-size bracket is constructed according to the con-
ditions presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
FIRM SIZE - CRITERIA 
Type of Firm  Number of Workers Output 
Micro <10 and <2 Million 
Small >10 and <50 and >2 Million and <10 Million 
Medium >50 and <250 and >10 Million and <50 Million 
Large >250 or >50 Million 
Source: Statistics Portugal. 
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Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the frm-level variables. The frms consid-
ered in the analysis have an average of 10 workers, 1.2 million € of output and 1.6 million € 
of assets. Concerning frm size, 82% are micro frms, 15% are small, 2% are medium and 
0.4% are large. Operational costs and cost of employees account for, on average, 0.3 and 0.2 
million €, respectively. 
Frontier frms are, on average, larger than laggard frms in terms of output, assets and 
workers (Table 2). Top performing frms are not only more productive; the difference vis-à-
vis laggards has been increasing over time (Figure 2), a pattern also visible for other OECD 
countries (Adalet McGowan et al., 2017a; Andrews et al., 2016). This warrants an assess-
ment of possible heterogeneous effects across the productivity distribution. Moreover, Figure 
3 shows TFP by frm status: incumbents, entrants and leavers. While up to 2008 the frms 
exiting the market have higher productivity than those entering, from 2009 onwards the pat-
tern is reversed. It is therefore important to investigate the possible relation between these 
changing patterns and the enacted product market reforms. 
Table 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - FIRM LEVEL DATA 
Variables Unit Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Mean 
frontier 
Mean 
laggards 
Output 103 € 1,218 26,700 0 10,300,000 5,214 774 
Operational Costs 103 € 288 5,621 0 1,820,000 735 238 
Cost of employees 103 € 174 2,114 0 5,030,00 252 152 
Assets 103 € 1,586 53,500 0 21,200,000 3,051 1,423 
Number of workers unit 10 89 1 22,734 13 9 
Micro Firms unit 0.82 0.38 0 1 0.72 0.83 
Small Firms unit 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.2 0.14 
Medium Firms unit 0.02 0.15 0 1 0.06 0.02 
Large Firms unit 0 0.07 0 1 0.01 0.00 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on IES. 
S
Figure 2: Estimated TFP – non-weighted 
average across firms (2004=100) 
Source: Authors’ own computations based on IES. 
Figure 3: TFP by status of firm: incum-
bents, new and exit firms 
ource: Authors’ own computations based on IES. 
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5. Methods and results 
5.1. Intensive margin effects 
In this section, we investigate the relationship between increased competition among 
intermediate goods producers and downstream incumbent frms’ performance. Our baseline 
equation builds on the reduced-form country-industry model in Bourlès et al. (2010) and the 
frm-level application in Arnold et al. (2008), both based on the theoretical contributions of 
Acemoglu et al. (2006) and Aghion and Howitt (2006). 
We depart from the notion that, in the long-run, the TFP of an individual frm depends 
both on the TFP of the frms at the sectorial technological frontier and on the regulatory 
impact of upstream regulation in the sector the frm operates. The identifcations rests on the 
assumption that even if barriers to competition are high upstream, a frm operating in a sec-
tor making little use of those inputs should be only marginally affected in comparison with 
a frm in a more exposed sector. This can be translated into the following Error Correction 
Model13: 
(1) 
Where ∆lnTFPi,k,t is the growth of total factor productivity for frm i in sector k at year 
t, ∆lnTFPFrontierk,t stands for the productivity growth at the sectorial technological frontier 
(percentile 90 of sectorial productivity) and RegImpactk,t-1 measures the impact of regulatory 
barriers upstream. Additionally, sectoral, time and region fxed effects are included (ak,a ,a ,t r 
respectively) to control for characteristics that are specifc to the sector, year and region. 
Following the literature frm controls are also included, in particular to control for size dif-
ferences in terms of number of workers and turnover (OECD, 2014). 
By restricting a1 to unity in equation (1), we can rewrite the expression in terms of the 
frms’ distance to the technological frontier (DTF, defned, at sectorial level, as TFP at the 
top decile minus TFP of the individual frm): 
(2) 
In this setting, b2 gives the effect of regulatory reforms in the short-run while a2 meas-
ures long term effects. In line with the theoretical and empirical literature, a2 is expected to 
be negative as frms operating in sectors more affected by upstream regulation are expected 
to perform worse in relative terms. The sign of b2 may be positive or negative as short-run 
effects are, as discussed, ambiguous and depend on different factors. Note that time fxed 
effects capture the average effect of upstream regulation and therefore our estimates of the 
regulatory impact coeffcient should be read as a differential effect on sectors with different 
exposures. b1 and h (defned as –d) account for the existence of technological diffusion and 
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catch-up effects and their signs are an empirical question. If b1 is positive, more productive 
frms are spreading innovative features across the economy through pass-through mecha-
nisms. A positive h signals a process of catching-up, where those further away from the 
frontier grow more. While so far the literature usually fnds positive diffusion and catch-up 
effects, more recent winner takes it all dynamics may change the sign of the coeffcient going 
forward, calling for particular attention in monitoring the estimated results14. 
Finally, in line with Bourlés et al. (2010) on a country-industry setting, our frm-level 
model is enriched with the interaction between the frm-level distance to the sectorial frontier 
and the regulatory impact, allowing for an asymmetric effect of regulation across the produc-
tivity spectrum:                        
(3) 
The long-term impact of regulation upstream is thus given by a2 + a3 DTFi,k,t-1 . As dis-
cussed before, the sign of a3 is an empirical question. If both a2 and a3 are negative, then 
higher competition upstream is more benefcial the further away the frm is from the secto-
rial frontier. If a2 is negative anda3 positive then the benefts of deregulation upstream are 
decreasing with the relative productivity of the frm. 
By estimating equation (3) (Table 4 – column “TFP growth - wide”), we fnd a positive 
association between higher growth at the frontier and the growth of other frms, hinting at 
the existence of positive diffusion mechanisms. The coeffcient of DTF is also positive, in 
line with a process of catching-up of the least productive. This means that innovation at the 
frontier is spread throughout the economy, with productivity gains for all frms. Moreover, 
deregulation in upstream sectors is, already in the short-run, positively related with produc-
tivity gains in downstream industries more dependent of those input sectors. This result is 
particularly important, given that some reforms were implemented during crisis years, where 
costs are more likely, and it is in line with the literature that underscores the still large po-
tential gains to be grasped from more effcient product markets (e.g. Égert et al., 2016a and 
Barnes et al., 2013)15. 
The positive correlation between deregulation of intermediate goods sectors and the 
productivity of downstream frms using those inputs is also present in the long-run and in-
creases with the distance to the technological frontier, as in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) 
and Conway et al. (2006)16. Less productive frms are more likely to be held-up by upstream 
frms with high market power and therefore deregulation provides for a level playing feld, 
promoting the conditions for these frms to grow. The increased competition downstream (for 
instance, due to easier entry given the improved access to upstream suppliers and the lower 
intermediate goods costs) is an added incentive for laggard frms to catch-up with the most 
productive ones in order to remain competitive. For the highly productive frms (according 
to the estimated DTF threshold, the 2% most productive), deregulation upstream may induce 
productivity losses, a result in line with Amable et al. (2016). An explanation may be that 
these frms had suffcient market power to circumvent some of the limitations in upstream 
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sectors and thus benefted from a competitive edge vis-à-vis the competitors that is elimi-
nated with the reforms. Also, if competition upstream induces higher competition down-
stream, the compressed mark-ups and increased market uncertainty may be limiting the in-
centives for the most productive to invest in more disruptive technologies that would allow 
productivity gains but that entail larger risks during the development process. 
The results are robust to a number of robustness tests (Table 4 – columns TFP growth 
– narrow; LP growth – wide; LP growth – narrow), namely the use of the narrow version of 
the regulatory indicator and the use of labor productivity instead of TFP. 
3.2. Extensive margin effects: the exit channel 
The impact of regulation on productivity may be driven by changes at the intensive margin
(i.e. changes in the TFP of frms in the market, as assessed in Section 3.1) or at the extensive
margin (i.e. the entry and exit of frms)17. Our hypothesis is that increased competition should
foster the exit of the least productive with no growth potential, thus contributing to a more ef-
fcient allocation of resources. We formalize this relation in the following equation: 
(4) 
Where Exiti,k,t is equal to 1 when a frm exits the market and 0 otherwise, TFPi,k,t-1 stands 
for the frm level of productivity and Regimpacti,k,t-1  is defned as in (1). Less productive 
frms are expected to be more likely to exit and increased competition should foster exit for 
all frms. Moreover, in sectors more exposed to deregulated upstream sectors, we expect a 
higher differential in the exit probabilities of frms with different levels of productivity, with 
the worst frms being more likely to exit. 
Table 3 
PRODUCTIVITY AND UPSTREAM REGULATION – RESULTS OF THE ESTIMATION 
OF EQUATION [3] 
TFP growth - 
wide 
TFP growth - 
narrow LP growth - wide 
LP growth -
narrow 
TFP growth frontier 0.38 0.34 0.23 0.22 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DTF (lag) 0.69 0.57 0.58 0.51 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RegImpact (lag) 
Short-term -0.12 -0.30 -0.13 -0.19 
0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Long-term -0.32 -1.46 -0.77 -1.16 
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(Continued) 
TFP growth - 
wide 
TFP growth - 
narrow LP growth - wide 
LP growth -
narrow 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Long-term #DTF -1.13 -0.56 -0.88 -0.88 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm size effects yes yes yes yes 
Region effects yes yes yes yes 
Year effects yes yes yes yes 
Sectorial effects yes yes yes yes 
N 1,522,076 1,522,076 1,669,162 1,669,162 
Source: Authors’ own computations using IES and OECD data. Notes: All equations are estimated by maximum 
likelihood. The frst line reports the estimated coeffcients and the second the associated P-value. Standard errors for 
the long-term coeffcients were obtained using the delta method in STATA. Errors are cluster at sectorial level. 
Given that the variables in equation (4) are continuous, the results are better cap-
tured graphically. Figure 5A, displays the marginal effect of changes in productivity
with the regulatory variable set at its maximum and minimum (i.e. 1 and 0); Figure 5B
varies regulation, for two given values of productivity (one very high and one very
low). Panel A illustrates that the lower the level of productivity, the higher the impact
of exposure to regulated sectors on the relative exit probability. Similarly, by compar-
ing two firms with different productivity levels, Panel B again shows that the difference
between their relative exit probabilities is higher in less rigid upstream regulatory en-
vironments.
In other words, increased competition fosters the exit of all frms (in comparison to frms 
in sectors not exposed to the deregulated sectors), but more so for the least productive. This 
result complements the literature on the positive impact of competition on churn rates (Lanau 
and Topalova, 2016, Gal and Hijzen, 2016), by highlighting the improvements in the eff-
ciency of the exit channel. While Section 3.1. shows that catch-up is potentiated by competi-
tion, here we highlight that frms that are not able to become more productive are more 
likely to exit the market. The result is robust to alternative specifcations, namely the use of 
the narrow version of the regulatory indicator and the use of labour productivity as the de-
pendent variable, instead of TFP. 
3.3. Resilience effects 
The analysis in the previous sections hints at an important selection effect of competi-
tion. While increased competition upstream is particularly benefcial for the laggard frms 
with potential to catch-up with the frontier (Section 3.1), the non-viable laggards face a 
higher likelihood of exiting (Section 3.2). This positive selection is likely to render down-
stream markets more resilient to adverse shocks. 
  Figure 4a: Exit model: predictive 
Margins (fixing the Regulatory Impact 
indicator) 
Source: Authors’ own computations using IES and 
OECD data. 
 
140 ana fontoura, gustavo monteiro and sílvia fonte santa
Figure 4b: Exit model: predictive
Margins (fixing productivity level) 
Source: Authors’ own computations using IES and 
OECD data. Note: The levels of productivity are 
hypothetical and should be seen as extreme values. The 
gains displayed are illustrative and should be read as 
upper bounds. 
Building on the literature on the positive effects of increased competition on market 
resilience, we apply a differences-in-differences approach to evaluate whether frms in sec-
tors more exposed to the reformed upstream sectors (treated group) are more resilient to 
adverse shocks. We expect their productivity levels to be less affected by the 2011 crisis, as 
compared to the control group (i.e. to frms less exposed to the reformed sectors). 
Given that, up to 2011, the most important reforms tackled the network sectors, we focus 
on exposure to network inputs. Moreover, within networks, there is one sector that stands 
out: the gas sector (Figure 6). Reforms entailed a signifcant reduction of public ownership, 
the reduction of entry barriers, the possibility of third party access to the gas transmission 
grid and the ability of consumers to freely choose their gas suppliers. 
Therefore, we rely on the usage of gas inputs to measure exposure and create the treated 
and control groups. The sectors included in the treated group (i.e. those above the percentile 
70) are Electricity, gas and water supply; Other non-metallic mineral products; Mining and 
quarrying; Basic metals; Hotels and Restaurants; Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fshing; 
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing and Rubber and plastics products. Those 
in the control group (i.e. below percentile 30) are Post and telecommunications; Electrical 
machinery and apparatus, nec; R&D and other business activities; Construction; Motor ve-
hicles, trailers and semi-trailers; Computer, Electronic and optical equipment; Renting of 
machinery and equipment and Coke, refned petroleum products and nuclear fuel. 
As the data source for inputs usage - the OECD sectorial input-output matrices – does 
not provide separate data for the gas sector, we take the values for gas, electricity and water 
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supply usage. This is not problematic as electricity is also one of the most reformed sectors, 
with reductions in the public ownership and improvements in the market structure. 
Figure 5: Product market regulation in network industries in Portugal 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database. 
Notes: Sectorial indicators vary between 0 and 6, increasing in the stringency of regulation. 
The treated and control sectors have, by construction, very different intensities of elec-
tricity, gas and water inputs usage: between 4% and 54% of total inputs for the treated group 
(corresponding to the top tercile) and from 0% to 1% for the control group (bottom tercile). 
In addition to these differences, Table 4 shows that frms in treated sectors are more produc-
tive but are also smaller, both in terms of number of employees and output. Operational costs 
and the cost of employees are higher in the control group. 
The binned scatterplot in Figure 6 allows for a visual representation of our data. It presents,
for each year, the mean productivity across frms within the treated and control groups, respec-
tively. The chart shows that frms in the treated group are on average more productive than those
in the control group and that the crisis negatively impacts both groups. However, it is also visible
that the treated group is less affected, with a lower decline in the average productivity level.
These results can be replicated with the following difference-in-differences specifcation:
(5) 
The dependent variable is the log of total factor productivity of frm I, in sector k and 
year t; Tk is the treatment dummy, i.e., i  indicates frms in treated sectors; S  is a time dummyt t 
that turns one from 2011 onwards, while Tk * S is the differences-in-differences term. Basedt 
on Figure 6, we expect a1 to be positive and a2 to be negative. Moreover, if our hypothesis 
that reforms render frms more resilient is confrmed, we also expect a3, the coeffcient of 
the interaction term, to be positive (but lower than a1). 
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The results in Table 5 confrm these expectations. In particular, while all frms face the 
adverse effect of the crisis, those in sectors more exposed to the reformed sectors are less 
affected and therefore have a lower decrease in TFP as compared to frms in the control 
group. The increased resilience is a result found by other authors (e.g. Cacciatori and Fiori, 
2016; Duval et al., 2007; Ernst et al., 2007; Pelkmans et al., 2008) and in this paper we shed 
light on the possible mechanism for this result. The intensive margin channel (Section 3.1) 
is allowing viable frms to catch-up with the frontier and therefore become larger. The exten-
sive margin channel is fostering the exit of the least productive with no ability to catch-up 
and strive (Section 3.2). The growth of good frms and the survival of the fttest renders frms 
operating in the market more resilient, via a process of positive selection. Moreover, in times 
of crisis, increased competition among intermediate goods producers means that downstream 
frms are not held-up by excessive market power upstream, which would force them to ab-
sorb a large share of the crisis imposed losses. 
Ideally, we should have a placebo group, running the same DiD in a period with a crisis 
but no deregulation policies. However, this is not possible, as our dataset only covers the 
period starting in 2004. In any case, we perform two robustness checks based on the avail-
able data. First, we compute the same regression without the electricity and gas sectors. 
These sectors could potentially bias our results, as they are directly affected by the reforms 
(on top of the usual downstream effects affecting all sectors). The results remain unchanged, 
as we continue to see more resilience in the treated group (Table 5). In addition, using LP 
instead of TFP also keeps the results qualitatively unchanged.  
Table 4 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – FIRM LEVEL DATA - DID ESTIMATION 
Variable Unit Treated Control tª 
Output 
Operational Costs 
Cost of Employees 
Assets 
lnTFP 
Number of workers 
103 € 
103 € 
103 € 
103 € 
unit 
unit 
1,120 
(28) 
164 
(3) 
118 
(2) 
1,622 
(81) 
2 
(0) 
8 
(0.11) 
1,289 
(70) 
434 
(10) 
195 
(4) 
1,762 
(48) 
1 
(0) 
11 
(0.14) 
-2.48 
-32.81 
-21.18 
-1.13 
200 
-16.09 
 Source: Authors’ own calculations based on IES.
Note: Test of equality of means in treated and control groups. 
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Figure 6: Mean TFP levels for treated and control groups 
Source: Author’s own calculations using IES data. N= 1,373,056. 
Note: The graph was produced using the Binscatter command in Stata, imposing a discontinuity in 2011. 
Table 5 
RESILIENCE MODEL: RESULTS OF THE ESTIMATION OF EQUATION [5] 
All sectors - lnTFP 
Excluding electricity and 
gas sectors - lnTFP 
All sectors -
lnTFP 
tª
Time -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.29*** -2.48 
0.00 0.00 0.01 
Treated 0.29** 0.29** 0.12 -32.81 
0.11 0.11 0.20 
DiD 0.04** 0.03** 0.11*** -21.18 
0.01 0.01 0.02 
Cons 1.31*** 1.31*** 0.11*** -1.13 
0.01 0.01 0.02 
Firm level controls YES YES YES 200 
N 1,373,056 1,369,516 1,490,905 
R2 0.03 0.03 0.01 -16.09 
(0.11) (0.14) 
Source: Authors’ own computations. For each explanatory variable, the frst line present the estimated coeffcient 
and the second the standard error (adjusted for clusters at sectorial level). * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
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6. Conclusion and way forward 
Deregulation of upstream sectors features highly in the structural reform agenda of many 
countries, and it is widely advocated by all major international institutions. For instance, in 
2017, close to two-thirds of the countries reviewed by the OECD in its fagship publication 
Going for Growth have upstream sector reforms has a key priority area. In the same vein, in 
the 2017 Annual Growth Survey, the document outlining the general economic priorities for 
the EU, the European Commission stresses the benefts of more competitive product mar-
kets: “opening up business services to more competition would beneft the EU economy as 
a whole”, “competitive retail services should allow consumers to grasp more benefts from 
digitisation, more effcient value chains, increased choice and lower prices” and “the further 
reduction of restrictions in the services markets would improve productivity and competi-
tiveness and lead to job creation”. 
While exiting literature indeed points to the benefts for the economy at large of im-
proved upstream regulation, there are a number of open empirical questions that we address 
in our contribution. 
The frst relates to the short-term impact of reforms. In particular, while economic crisis 
are good opportunities to push for reforms, as structural weaknesses become clearer, down-
turns also make related short-term costs more likely, for instance because frm exit is not 
promptly compensated by new entrants18. By focusing on a top product market reformer 
among OECD countries, where several reforms were implemented during a severe eco-
nomic crisis, we show that the benefts are suffciently large to ensure that the deregulation 
of intermediate goods providers is benefcial for the average frm, already in the short-run. 
This is particularly relevant for the sustainability of the reform process, as costs, even if 
temporary, erode the support for the reform agenda and may not only hamper future reform 
efforts but also reverse some of the past efforts. 
The second contribution relates to the impact of reforms across the productivity distribu-
tion. We fnd a stronger relation between deregulation upstream and productivity for frms 
further away from the sectorial technological frontier. Our intuition for this result is that 
market power upstream is particularly damaging for laggard frms, which are more likely to 
be held-up by upstream frms. The removal of this ineffciency, coupled with increased com-
petition downstream as a result of increased competition upstream (as, for instance, entry 
downstream becomes easier, given the enhanced access to intermediate goods producers) 
boost incentives for laggard frm to catch-up and remain competitive. At the same time, the 
increased competition drives the least productive with no growth opportunities out of the 
market, promoting a more effcient allocation of resources and reducing market congestion. 
For the top performers within each sector, increased competition upstream acts as a level 
playing feld vis-à-vis laggard competitors. Moreover, the reduced mark-ups and the in-
creased market uncertainty reduces the incentives to engage in disruptive innovation, crucial 
in sustaining productivity gains for already top performing frms, but also riskier in terms of 
expected returns. 
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These results show that upstream reforms have broad-based benefts, providing an op-
portunity for viable frms to catch-up with the sectorial frontier. This is particularly relevant 
in a context where the emergence of new business models and of winner takes it all dynam-
ics reduce the ability for laggard frms to remain competitive and potentiate increased market 
concentration19. At the same time, our results have two downsides that warrant targeted 
policy action. The frst is the discouraging effects for the top performers that can be tackled 
with measures such as strong intellectual property rights (Aghion et al. 2015), thereby ensur-
ing that the incentives to expand the technological frontier, in particular via disruptive in-
novation, remain. The second relates to the positive selection of the most productive, which, 
while improving productivity and effciency, may have an adverse impact on segments of the 
labor market and on inequality. Measures to improve on skill mismatches and effective active 
labor market policies are therefore important complements to upstream deregulation (An-
drews and Saia, 2017 and OECD, 2015). 
Finally, we argue that the improved catching-up of laggards frms, allowing them to 
grow, and the survival of the fttest concur for frms’ improved resilience to adverse shocks. 
In addition, limiting the market power of intermediate goods producers makes it more dif-
fcult for them to pass-on the crisis induced costs to downstream companies. By comparing 
frms more and less exposed to the sectors reformed before the economic crisis, we indeed 
fnd evidence that more exposed frms were better able to weather the negative effect of the 
crisis, with a smaller decline in productivity. This additional beneft is less studied than the 
impact on the intensive and extensive margins but it is an important one. It ensures that frms 
are less affected by adverse shocks, contributing to the reduction of the amplitude of the 
downturn and to a quicker recovery, also reducing the possible hysteresis effects. 
Overall, our results ft into a large body of literature shedding light on the direct and 
indirect impact of removing excessive regulation in upstream sectors. A more effective com-
munication of these results, beyond academic circles, would potentiate ownership and pro-
vide the necessary support for reforms, key elements of any successful and sustained reform 
process20. This is true for all reform areas but it is even more relevant in the case of upstream 
deregulation, where vested interests are particularly acute, given the concentrated costs and 
the diffuse benefts. As noted by the President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, 
“during the crisis, because of powerful vested interests, labour market reforms were not ac-
companied by product market reforms in some countries, and so wages fell and prices did 
not adjust in tandem”21. While EU directives have been playing a critical role in pushing 
forward deregulation of upstream sectors at national level (Banerji et al., 2017), a more in-
formed discussion would also facilitate targeted action to deal with the costs induced on 
those with vested interests, namely by enacting transitory measures that allow for a smooth-
er transition22. 
Going forward, the robustness of our econometric results need to be further validated, in 
particular concerning causality. As noted by Bourlès et al. (2013), omitted variable bias may 
be present, with the estimates possibly capturing changes in these other variables. As up-
stream deregulation was accompanied by other important reform efforts, reform variables in 
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different areas are strongly correlated. Therefore, our coeffcients may be overestimating the 
impact of upstream deregulation, by capturing other reform efforts that occurred at the same 
time and that concur for improved productivity. Additional efforts are needed to model re-
form complementarities and the impact of the countries initial regulatory stance. Moreover, 
one could argue that reforms are endogenous, as sectors with higher expected pay-offs lobby 
more strongly for reforms. In the case of Portugal, this is somewhat mitigated, as several 
reforms were part of the Economic Adjustment Programme negotiated with the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
The underlying data could also be further enhanced. On the regulation indicators, a bet-
ter identifcation of the timing of the reform could enhance the quality of the results. Moreo-
ver, de jure measures of competition may not adequately capture the actual effects of legisla-
tive changes, which can be hampered by administrative capacity limitations. In any case, de 
facto measures of competition also present important drawbacks, as they are endogenous 
outcomes. The frm level variables could also be further enhanced, in particular concerning 
the computation of total factor productivity, which is dependent not only on the measures of 
capital and labor but also on the underlying production function and on the econometric 
techniques applied in its estimation. While our results are robust to the use of labor produc-
tivity (which encompasses total factor productivity and capital deepening) as the dependent 
variable, alternative measures could be explored. 
Finally, the mechanisms through which the reforms operate need to be further investi-
gated, shedding light on the links between upstream and downstream developments. Further-
more, as stressed by Pelkmans and Renda (2014), regulation is a broad concept and not all 
regulation is harmful. A deeper look into the differentiated effects across the different types 
of regulations is warranted. In addition, while total factor productivity is a key determinant 
of growth, a full assessment of the reforms’ impact can only be done by also considering the 
impact on investment and labour utilisation, in particular on employment23. An encompass-
ing view of the literature is thus essential to fully ascertain the impact of reforms. Equity 
considerations need to take a more central stage, as the distributional effects of reforms have 
been less studied so far, also due to the demanding data requirements (worker or household 
level data). 
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Notes 
1. For studies focusing on the direct effects of upstream deregulation on upstream sectors, please refer for in-
stance to Gal and Hijzen (2016) and Lanau and Topalova (2016). 
2. We refer to a healthy level of competition given that, as noted by Aghion et al. (2005), excessive deregulation 
can also be detrimental. The effects of competition on productivity are therefore hump-shaped, as explained 
by the authors: “The essence of the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation is that the 
fraction of sectors with neck-and neck competitors is itself endogenous, and depends upon equilibrium innova-
tion intensities in the different types of sectors. More specifcally, when competition is low, a larger equilib-
rium fraction of sectors involve neck-and-neck competing incumbents, so that overall the escape-competition 
effect is more likely to dominate the Schumpeterian effect. On the other hand, when competition is high, the 
Schumpeterian effect is more likely to dominate, because a larger fraction of sectors in equilibrium have in-
novation being performed by laggard frms with low initial profts”. At one extreme, if competition is so low 
that there exits only one frm, there are no incentives to innovate. At the other extreme, if competition is so 
strong that frms cannot absorb any rents from innovation, then productivity is negatively affected. 
3. For instance, Gal and Hijzen (2016) show that, while the effect of reforms is always positive for downstream 
sectors, it is more visible for manufacturers, which operate in a sector that is, in general, more competitive (and 
thus have more to gain in terms of increase output from potential price reductions made possible for lower 
priced inputs). By further exploring the direct effects on the reformed upstream sectors, the authors argue that 
higher initial regulation may bring higher short-term costs but also larger long-term gains. 
4. From the different reform areas, product market reforms are expected to produce the largest economic gains 
when compared to other reforms (see, for instance, Égert and Gal, 2016 and Barnes et al., 2013). 
5. See Koske et al. (2014) for further details on the indicators. 
6. See Égert and Wanner (2016) for more information. Earlier applications of this methodology can be found for 
instance in Conway and Nicoletti (2006). 
7. For a discussion on the pros and cons of using the wide and narrow indicators, see Égert and Wanner (2016). 
8. For more details, see Supplement to Banco de Portugal Statistical Bulletin 1|2008 “Simplifed reporting: Inclu-
sion of the Simplifed Corporate Information in the Statistics on Non-Financial Corporations from the Central 
Balance Sheet Database of May 2008”. 
9. We rely on the STATA code developed by Petrin et al. (2004). 
10. Please refer to Petrin et al. (2004) for additional details. 
11. The included sectors are Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fshing; Mining and quarrying; Food products, 
beverages and tobacco; Wood and products of wood and cork; Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and pub-
lishing; Coke, refned petroleum products and nuclear fuel; Chemicals and chemical products; Rubber and 
plastics products; Other non-metallic mineral products; Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear; Basic 
Metals; Fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment; Machinery and equipment n.e.c; Motor 
vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; Other transport equipment; Electricity, gas and water supply; Construction; 
Transport and storage; Post and telecommunications; Real estate activities; Offce, accounting and computing 
machinery; Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c; Radio, television and communication equipment; Medi-
cal, precision and optical instruments; Manufacturing n.e.c and recycling; Wholesale and retail trade, repairs; 
Hotels & Restaurants; Renting of machinery and equipment; Computer and related activities; Other Business 
Activities; Research and Development. Note that deregulated sectors are also included as they also use inter-
mediate goods in their production process. 
12. This division includes 7 regions, covering Mainland Portugal and Islands. 
13. For the statistical properties of Error Correction Models, please refer to Hendry (1996). 
14. See, for instance, Autor et al. (2017). 
15. It also means that, absent the crisis, the short-term effects would have been stronger. 
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16. In other words, the process of catching-up is limited by lack of competition upstream and may actually be 
hampered for very high levels of upstream regulation (higher than the maximum of our time series). 
17. In our analysis, we focus on the exit margin but, ideally, one would like to also explore the entry channel. 
However, an assessment of entry at the frm-level is particularly challenging as it requires data on the pool of 
entrants and not only on those frms that actually entered the market. 
18. Dias da Silva et al. (2017) show that the implementation of structural reforms is more likely during deep reces-
sions. 
19. In the 2017 Annual Growth Survey, the European Commission notes that “particular attention needs to be 
given to the diffusion of new technologies among small and medium-sized companies. Their diffculties in 
taking up new technologies and gaining access to fresh capital are more acute in a globalised, technology-
driven economy”. 
20. The literature shows that information is crucial to boost support for reforms (Boeri and Tabellini, 2012; Gou-
veia, 2017). 
21. Introductory remarks by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, at the ECB conference “Structural reforms in 
the euro area”, Frankfurt am Main, 18 October 2017. 
22. As noted by Banerji et al. (2017), past reforms “were incentivized by grandfathering–for example, during the 
liberalization of professional services in the Netherlands there was a two-year transition period for public 
notaries”. 
23. Existing evidence points to positive effects on employment, that strengthen over time (OECD, 2016; Fiori et 
al., 2012), as higher competition upstream decreases downstream input prices and eliminates the market-
power of upstream sectors vis-à-vis downstream frms, reducing their ability to partially capture downstream 
rents (Bourlès et al., 2010). Bassanini (2015) shows that employment in upstream sectors is temporarily re-
duced, via downsizing of incumbents. 
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Resumen 
A partir de un rico conjunto de datos a nivel de empresa para uno de los países de la OCDE que mayor 
número de reformas ha realizado durante la última década, encontramos una asociación positiva, en el 
corto plazo, entre la productividad de la empresa y la desregulación de los sectores de productos inter-
medios. Los efectos a largo plazo dependen de la productividad de la empresa, aumentando las ganan-
cias con la distancia a la frontera de posibilidades de producción tecnológica sectorial (nacional). Es 
más probable que las empresas menos efcientes sean rehenes de los productores con mayor poder de 
mercado en las fases anteriores de la cadena de producción, por lo que su potencial de mejora es mayor 
que el de las empresas más productivas. Estas empresas se encuentran mejor preparadas para hacer 
frente a las inefciencias de los mercados de productos intermedios de las fases anteriores del proceso 
productivo. Los resultados indican que las empresas más productivas reducen sus incentivos para in-
novar como consecuencia de la reducción de su ventaja competitiva, de la disminución de los márgenes 
de benefcio y del aumento de la incertidumbre. Encontramos indicios de la existencia de una selección 
positiva entre las empresas menos efcientes: en el caso de las empresas viables las reformas aumentan 
su potencial de crecimiento y les permiten ponerse al día. En las empresas que no son viables aumen-
ta la probabilidad de quiebra ya que no son capaces de competir en un entorno más exigente. De hecho, 
mientras que el aumento de la competencia en las fases fnales del proceso productivo (como resultado 
del aumento de la competencia en fases anteriores del proceso productivo) está asociado a mayores 
probabilidades de quiebra para todo tipo de empresas, los resultados muestran una asociación más 
fuerte para las empresas con menor productividad. Por último, cuando comparamos los resultados de 
las empresas más y menos expuestas a las reformas anteriores a la crisis, observamos que la supervi-
vencia de las más productivas y el crecimiento de las rezagadas pero viables aumenta la resistencia de 
las empresas que operan en el mercado. 
Palabras clave: reformas estructurales, mercados de productos, productividad. 
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